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Abstract. Social robots need intelligence in order to safely coexist and
interact with humans. Robots without functional abilities in understand-
ing others and unable to empathise might be a societal risk and they may
lead to a society of socially impaired robots. In this work we provide a
survey of three relevant human social disorders, namely autism, psy-
chopathy and schizophrenia, as a means to gain a better understanding
of social robots’ future capability requirements. We provide evidence sup-
porting the idea that social robots will require a combination of emotional
intelligence and social intelligence, namely socio-emotional intelligence.
We argue that a robot with a simple socio-emotional process requires a
simulation-driven model of intelligence. Finally, we provide some critical
guidelines for designing future socio-emotional robots.
Keywords: social robots, socio-emotional intelligence, empathy, theory
of mind, simulation theory, autism, psychopathy, schizophrenia.
1 Introduction
Social robots are embodied intelligent agents designed to coexist and interact
with humans or with other social robots [9]. In order to avoid risks for the society
their behaviour must to be safe and conform to social norms. Social intelligence,
defined as the ability to make sense of others’ actions and react appropriately
to them [23], plays a crucial role in regulating acceptable interactions between
people. Thus, social robots will require a form of social intelligence too [34].
In psychology studies, together with social intelligence, we find a subtly dif-
ferent form of intelligence, namely emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence
is defined as the ability to perceive, manage, and reason about emotions, within
oneself and others [14]. Emotional intelligence is generally considered part of so-
cial intelligence [29]. However, in the robotic literature social intelligence is com-
monly introduced without considering this important need of emotional states
elicitation and understanding.
In our everyday society there are people with an abnormal social behaviour.
This population exhibits brain disorders involving deficits in social intelligence.
It seems plausible that future social robots with high level cognitive capabilities,
but lacking in social intelligence skills will develop similar social deficits [34].
In this work we want to provide a survey of human social disorder concerning
deficiencies in social intelligence, so to gather significant information that can
be used to trace a design guideline for future social robots. This is necessary in
order to avoid the possibility of developing a society of socially impaired robots.
How can people achieve social intelligence? If we turn to psychology, philos-
ophy, or the cognitive sciences in general, Theory of Mind (ToM) is the most
shared and common strategy for gaining social intelligence abilities. ToM is de-
fined as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others [28]. It pro-
vides mechanisms for comprehending/explaining everyday social situations, for
predicting and anticipating others’ behaviour, and even for manipulating other
individuals.
Two main models of ToM are provided in the literature: Theory-Theory (TT)
and Simulation Theory (ST). In the TT account the mind-reader deploys a na¨ıve
psychological theory to infer mental states in others from their behaviour, the
environment, and/or their other mental states [18]. On the other hand, according
to ST, the mind-reader select a mental state to attribute to others after repro-
ducing or enacting within himself the very state in question, or a relevantly
similar one [18]. In this way the mind-readers do not need theories; instead, they
use their own body as a model of others.
Both ST and TT provide valid theories of how people can master the ability
of making sense of others’ social behaviour. However, from a social perspec-
tive there is a remarkable difference: ST requires an embodiment and the use
of phenomenological mechanisms in order to “put the mind-reader in other’s
shoes”, however, TT does not. ST contributes in resonating and so empathising
with others, thus modulating socially acceptable behaviours, whereas TT works
in a more mechanical and ‘cold’ vision. More specifically, a simulation-driven
approach provides phenomenological bases for the development of social repu-
tation, since it allows us to think about what others think of us and feel the
corresponding positive or negative sentiment (i.e. they see me as a good person
vs. bad person). The feeling elicited from the social reputation process via sim-
ulation, in turn, might become an incentive for individuals to conform to social
norms [21].
Individuals with disorders related to social deficits show difficulties in em-
pathising with and mentalising about others [15]. As suggested by Dautenhahn:
“the better we understand human psychology and human internal dynamics,
the more we can hope to explain embodiment and empathic understanding on
a scientific basis” [8, p. 22]. Following this advice, and motivated by the pre-
viously exposed problematic scenario, in Section 2 we propose a brief survey
of the most documented human social disorders and related deficits functional
to social intelligence, namely autism, psychopathy and schizophrenia. In Sec-
tion 3 we discuss this evidence, we define socio-emotional intelligence and then
relate it to necessary sub processes. Finally, in Section 4 we provide our conclu-
sions and a research agenda that will lead to the development of socio-emotional
robots. To our knowledge this is the first study that tries to investigate human
social disorders as a means to provide design principles for future social robot
development.
2 A Survey of Human Social Disorders
2.1 Autism Spectrum Disorders
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) individuals are characterized with deficits in
three main areas: (i) communication, (ii) social interaction, and (iii) restrictive
and repetitive behaviours and interests [1].
ToM is one of the main social skills in which ASD population shows defi-
ciencies [15]. Compared with normally developed persons, ASD individuals are
poorer at reasoning about what others think, know, or believe, recognizing emo-
tional expressions and gestures, and making social attributions and judgements
[2]. However, deficits in ToM ability are only the tip of the iceberg.
Indeed, ASD individuals show other social deficits functional to ToM, for
example they are poor in understanding the emotional content of face expres-
sion, gestures and vocalizations and they fail in using these social signals as a
way to express their own internal emotional state (e.g. arm around shoulder,
hand over mouth, signalling embarrassment, . . . ) [5]. These deficits in emo-
tion recognition/responding often lead to an impoverished facial affect. Thus,
ASD individuals are perceived as unable to feel emotions. However, studies with
electrodermal responses and self-report measures suggest that ASD individuals
have appropriate emotional responsiveness to others [12]. Hence, ASD individu-
als seem to be able to normally experience such phenomenological internal states
at least.
One of the earliest signs of ASD is a lack of sensitivity to social cues. For
example, they exhibit poor eye contact, they have difficulties in joint attention
(either using eyes, head pose or pointing gestures) and they show disinterest
to other people [7,5,15]. Many studies investigated the gaze direction of ASD
individuals using eye tracking systems. They found that this population look less
at the eyes relatively to control participants (for a review see [31]). Birmingham
and her research group suggest that perhaps the abnormality in ASD people lies
in the likelihood that they will seek out and select social information from a
scene; if such a population does not consider important social signals like others’
gaze orientation, they will not be able for example to infer where others are
looking. Due to this perceptual deficit, they might have less evidence to use
during a mind-reading process [7].
Aligned to this perspective, Dawson et al. propose that social orienting
deficits might cause ASD development and subsequent ToM deficiencies [10].
This hypothesis suggests that individuals developing with ASD fail to attend
social stimuli from an early age. This lack of crucial social information during
the normal development provokes later social cognitive deficits, such as facial
expression processing and mind-reading.
Indeed, social orienting deficits can also explain their lacks in emotion recog-
nition from social signals. Perhaps this population possesses embodied mecha-
nisms to feel others’ emotions, as well as mechanism for ‘resonating’ to others
facial expressions and body movements (i.e. a functioning Mirror Neuron Sys-
tems, see [4,20] for a discussion). However, they lack of a social reward process
and they cannot direct the attention on stimuli necessary for promoting mind-
reading abilities [21]. Without focusing on important social signals, like the eyes,
they might have severe limitations in ToM [4].
2.2 Psychopathy
The World Health Organization classifies Psychopathy as a form of antisocial
(or dissocial) personality disorder [25]. Characteristics of such disorder are: (i)
callous unconcern for the feelings of others; (ii) incapacity to maintain enduring
relationships, though having no difficulty in establishing them; (iii) very low tol-
erance to frustration and a low threshold for discharge of aggression, including
violence; (iv) incapacity to experience guilt or to profit from experience, partic-
ularly punishment; (v) marked proneness to blame others, or to offer plausible
rationalizations, for the behaviour that has brought the patient into conflict with
society [25].
In contradistinction to what is commonly believed, psychopathic individuals
do not always present violent and criminal behaviour. Indeed, this population is
mainly characterized by a lack of ‘emotional empathy’ [15]; they have a reduced
ability to feel other people’s emotional state, especially sadness and fear [11].
Psychopathic subjects have deficits in moral emotions such as remorse and guilt
and they are usually indifferent to shaming and embarrassing situations [14].
Antisocial personalities usually exhibit a poor executive control, that is nor-
mally necessary for socially appropriate conduct [11]. This dysfunction might be
due to non-responding violence inhibition mechanisms that are normally trig-
gered during the feeling of others’ distress in order to prevent the execution
of antisocial behaviours [3]. Indeed, psychopathic individuals own a poor be-
havioural control, leading often to impulsivity. Furthermore, a study on startle
reflex modulation of visual attention demonstrates that psychopathic individu-
als, compared to normal population, present an abnormal valence pattern [27].
The authors suggest that even if psychopaths express different subjective judge-
ments to positive vs. aversive visual stimuli, they may find such stimuli equally
inviting from an attention controlling perspective. This may be due to a dys-
function in attention reflex reactions when perceiving unpleasant content [27].
These evidences well support the existence of emotion regulation deficiencies in
such population [14].
Deficits in emotion regulation seem to affect also face processing abilities.
Psychopaths are impaired when processing fearful, sad and disgusted facial ex-
pressions, whereas it seems that they do not have impairments with happy facial
expression, even if this should be due to the ease with which such expression
is recognized [15]. Furthermore, this population has deficits in other emotional
processing skills, such as failure to show normal response differentiation to emo-
tional and neutral words, and abnormal reactions to emotional stimuli and events
[14].
Surprisingly, this mental disorder does not involve abnormal levels of intel-
ligence [14]. In fact, in contrast to other disorders like autism, psychopathic
individuals successfully complete ToM tasks and currently there is no evidence
of impairments in ‘cognitive’ (i.e. not emotional or empathic) ToM ability [15].
However, due to deficits in experiencing emotions, psychopath individuals can-
not simulate them, and must rely exclusively on cognitive inputs in order to fulfil
a mind-reading task [11].
2.3 Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a severe psychiatric disorder altering emotional, cognitive, and
social functions [26]. In particular, significant impairment in social functioning
is considered one diagnostic characteristic of schizophrenia [1]. Such impairment
can have seriously impacts on social relationships [22]. Schizophrenic subjects
suffer also from delusions and hallucinations, however in this survey we will
consider only their deficits primarily related with social intelligence abilities (for
a discussion on ToM and correlations with these symptoms, see [6]).
Similarly to autistic and psychopathic individuals, schizophrenic individuals
lack general abilities in ToM and empathy [32,15]. In fact, some current models
of schizophrenia suggest that this disorder can be understood as a deficit in rep-
resenting others’ mental states (i.e. cognitive ToM) and of ‘resonating’ to others’
emotional states (i.e. empathy) [15]. However, even in this case deficits in these
abilities are just the tip of the iceberg; indeed different cognitive sub processes
seem to be affected in schizophrenia leading to a differentiation of such deficien-
cies respect to psychopathy and ASD. For example, whereas schizophrenic indi-
viduals seem to be able at least to understand the intended meaning of sincere
interpersonal exchanges (differently from ASD population), they show deficien-
cies in insincere interactions, such as in understanding sarcastic conversations,
that indeed lie more on emotional features such as prosody and intonation [32].
Schizophrenic individuals exhibit blunted feeling and they usually have inap-
propriate affective responses in social situations [15]. They show abnormalities
of skin conductance response and they mostly respond with negative affect (e.g.
depression) [15]. Furthermore, this population exhibits deficits in subjective ex-
perience of emotion [24]. Studies demonstrate that schizophrenic patients emo-
tionally respond with fewer positive and negative facial expressions in response
to emotional stimuli compared to normal population [13]. However, evidence
from other studies support the idea that schizophrenic people can indeed feel
emotional states, but they cannot sustain attention over the emotional stimuli
and thus maintaining such emotional state during time.
Horan et al. used affective pictures as emotional stimuli in order to record
the Event Related Potentials (ERP) of schizophrenic subjects [19]. The results
show that schizophrenic individuals experience comparable amounts of similar
emotions with respect to normal populations during the initial ERP components,
but not in Late Positive Potentials (LPP). The authors suggest that this popula-
tion may have functioning emotional response mechanisms, but a disruption in a
later component associated with sustained attention processing of the observed
emotional stimuli [19]. This inability to maintain the correct emotional response
over time is correlated with deficits in executive control. In fact, without a suf-
ficient elicitation of emotional processing over time it becomes critical to guide
future behavioural choices [19].
The previous studies demonstrate attention deficits in schizophrenic popula-
tions. Indeed, these individuals perform poorly on nearly all tests of sensory and
cognitive vigilance and some studies also demonstrate deficits in selective atten-
tion [26]. It has also been shown that there are abnormalities in eye movements
during the scanning of emotional facial expressions. Similarly to ASD people,
schizophrenic individuals look less at the eye region of the face [15,7]. Again, in
a similar way as in ASD populations, schizophrenic patients show partial gaze
avoidance specific to human faces, whereas they do not avoid gaze when they
look to non-human faces [33]. However, a study by Sasson et al. provides evi-
dence for a differentiation of emotional processing deficits in schizophrenics and
ASD people [30]. Their results demonstrate that, whereas autism and schizophre-
nia share an impairment in fixating social stimuli (i.e. avoidance of eye region),
the schizophrenic individuals show a delay in orienting the gaze to informative
emotional stimuli (in this study faces). Thus it seems that, whereas autistic pop-
ulations fail in the specificity of selective attention concerning emotional stimuli,
schizophrenic population exhibited a generalized orienting delay [30].
Given this evidence it seems that schizophrenic individuals’ inability to main-
tain sustained attention and their delay of selective attention over emotional
stimuli are strictly correlated with deficiencies in social intelligence.
3 A Socio-Emotional Robotic Intelligence
In the introduction we suggested the need for social robots to possess social in-
telligence. We identified ToM as a crucial strategy to achieve such intelligence.
However, we also mentioned that we need to prevent a society of ‘socially im-
paired robots’. Under this perspective creating robots able to perfectly under-
stand humans’ intentions and react appropriately to them in a pure rational way
is not enough. In fact, we have seen that psychopaths, that indeed are able to
understand others’ intentions, are a risk for the society as they can use ToM to
manipulate or hurt people because unable to empathize or to feel sense of guilt.
We provided evidence demonstrating that the elicitation and regulation of
emotions (i.e. emotional intelligence) are crucial skills needed to avoid, for ex-
ample, psychopathic traits. Thus, given the importance of exhibiting both social
and emotional intelligences, we provide a clearer and explicit definition of socio-
emotional robot. We define a socio-emotional robot1 as a robot able to direct
1 In robotic literature the term socio-emotional robot was already widely used; how-
ever, to our knowledge, nobody provided an explicit definition of it.
attention over others’ social behaviour, to make sense of it and to elicit correct
emotional processes regulating and learning the expression of its behaviours in
order to conform to society’s culture, ethics, morality and common-sense.
Making sense of others’ social behaviour can be achieved using ToM, whereas
eliciting emotional processes for behaviour regulation and development is more
related with empathy. Indeed, empathy may be a central feature of emotion-
ally intelligent behaviour and it can be used to relate positively to others, thus
increasing life satisfaction, reducing stress and motivating altruistic behaviour
[29]. More specifically, a person can feel what the other person is feeling and so
behave conformably to past experiences related with very similar feelings. Fur-
thermore, a socio-emotional robot might learn correct behaviour through direct
experience of its emotional states. Thus, having processes for emotion elicitation
might facilitate the learning of society norms through a first-person experience.
3.1 The Need for a Simulative Mechanism
At the beginning of this paper we mentioned two possible approaches to mas-
ter ToM: simulation-driven approaches and theory-driven approaches. Although
both the approaches can be an acceptable explanation for mind-reading abil-
ity, when we look at empathy (and more in general at emotional intelligence)
simulation-driven approaches play a crucial role in allowing this ability, as for
example Goldman contends [17]. Further support comes also from neuroscience
studies of Gallese [16]. Thus, it seems plausible that in order to exhibit emotional
intelligence a simulative mechanism is needed. As our previous survey on human
social disorders demonstrate the need of both social and emotional intelligence
(i.e. socio-emotional intelligence) in order to avoid social disorders, we suggest
the need of simulative mechanism in social robots. With this recommendation
we are not saying that theories about the world are not necessary for a fully
understanding of others, but rather that at some preliminary levels a simula-
tion process is needed in developing empathy and promoting socio-emotional
intelligence.
A simplified socio-emotional process can be described as: (a) detecting a
social behaviour, (b) enacting a simulation process given such stimulus and al-
lowing an as-if internal representation of it, (c) activate an appropriate viscero-
emotional internal state (again through a simulation process), (d) use past expe-
rience and theories in order to give an interpretation to the perceived stimulus,
(e) properly regulate the appraisal of the emotional state and the expression
of an appropriate behaviour through (c), (d) and other theories about culture,
ethics, morality and common-sense.
In most cases robotic studies on social intelligence make use of only two of
such processes, namely (a) and (d). In fact, aligned with a pure information-
based approach, researchers make use of datasets of social stimuli (face expres-
sions, gestures, etc.) in order to create theories or models (d) to use for the
interpretation of new social stimuli (a). Given the previous survey we can argue
that this approach potentially leads to possible social disorders and thus justify
the need of a simulation mechanism in socio-emotional robots.
We have seen that ASD individuals have a deficit in directing attention over
social stimuli (a), thus leading to deficit in representing them internally (b). On
the contrary they do not show deficits in activating appropriate visceral states
(c), if properly stimulated. Deficits in (a) throughout their life lead to learn
poor social-life theories (d) in conjunction with their visceral states (c). This
might explain their inability in fulfilling a successful socio-emotional process,
since they poorly direct attention over social stimuli, thus reducing evidence for
a mind-reading process, and as they develop a poor learning of (d) given (c).
On the other hand, psychopathic subjects show normal capacities in perceiv-
ing and processing social stimuli (a,b), but they cannot elicit viscero-emotional
states (c). This again might explain their ability in mind-reading people (d) us-
ing social evidences (a,b) but their deficits in regulating empathic and moral
behaviours (e) because unable to empathise with others (c).
Finally, schizophrenic population suggests the importance of synchronizing
the processes of socio-emotional intelligence. A delay or dysfunction in sustain
and selective attention over social stimuli (a) might lead to non-synchronized or
distorted internal and cognitive processes (b,c,d) over time. This in turn leads
to deficiencies in mind-reading and emotion regulation (e).
4 Conclusions and Guidelines for Socio-Emotional
Robots
In this work we motivated the need for robots to be able to coexist in human
spaces avoiding risks and costs for the society. In order to understand better how
to design such a kind of safe robots we proposed a brief survey of human social
disorders. We proposed the need of emotional intelligence together with social
intelligence, and in order to clarify better these necessary intelligences in robots
we provided an explicit definition of socio-emotional robot. We suggested the
need of socio-emotional intelligence in order to avoid socially impaired robots. We
provided a simple model of a socio-emotional process and we used the evidences
from the survey as a way to motivate the need of a simulation process in order
to avoid social deficits.
Given the need of socio-emotional intelligence for development of future
robots, we suggest an agenda of necessary future research. First, social roboti-
cists will need to provide appropriate mechanisms of attention modulation over
social stimuli (a). In order to fulfil this target we will need to understand the
mechanisms underlying social rewarding of social stimuli. Second, some kinds of
simulation models will be necessary in order to represent perceived stimuli and
activate an appropriate internal response in the robot (b,c). The internal repre-
sentation of the stimuli might require a mapping from the external multimodal
representation to an internal unimodal one; this is necessary in order to integrate
different modalities under a unique and more computationally tractable form of
representation. This is similar to our capacity of mapping multimodal external
stimuli to unimodal neural activations. Third, we will need learning mechanisms
allowing the association between internal representation and appropriate mental
attributions (d). A further process of decision making is then necessary in order
to drive the robot’s executive attention and regulate its behaviour (e).
We want to conclude mentioning some limitations of the current study. First,
the proposed survey is limited to three social disorders. There are others syn-
dromes and brain dysfunctions that worth a discussion and enrich our argument,
but for the sake of simplicity we limited our work to the most investigated social
dysfunctions. Second, studies on ASD individuals, psychopaths and schizophren-
ics are not so linear as proposed in this survey. There are many controversies and
open questions, but in order to provide a readable manuscript and an argument
easy to follow we proposed some limited studies about hypotheses commonly
shared in the related literature. We are confident that studies like the one re-
ported in this manuscript will allow a better understanding of the human brain.
This in turn is an essential knowledge if we want to develop intelligent machines.
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